As reflected in the title of their book, Ernie Lepore and Matthew Stone maintain that there are two ways in which language productions (spoken or written) can engage our minds. On the one hand, there are linguistic conventions, which are entirely responsible for the public propositional content that our utterances convey, so grasping that content is a matter of knowing the relevant conventions. These contents are entered on the conversational scoreboard, which keeps a record of our meaning-making and the constraints on it.
things work in the world. The inferences drawn hinge on believing that if a person is at one stage of the process they have not yet reached what is typically a later stage. It is straightforward enough to give Gricean rational reconstructions of the derivation of these meanings, employing a line of reasoning very similar to the standard scalar cases, governed by the maxims of quantity and relation (see Hirschberg 1991 , Geurts 2010 .
These are cases of conversational implicature, as Grice conceived of this construct (Grice 1989) , and they make important contributions to the conversation, contributions which one might reasonably think would be recorded on the conversational scoreboard/record. To use L&S's terminology, they are public contributions to the inquiry at issue and involve certain commitments on the part of the interlocutors. However, given L&S's strictures, they won't be registered on the scoreboard because they are not wholly a function of linguistic conventions. This looks like a clear problem for their view.
Many post-Gricean pragmatic theorists think there is more to the role of pragmatics in utterance understanding than the derivation of conversational implicatures. In fact, a lot of implicatures, especially (but not only) those initially categorised as 'generalised', have been reanalysed as cases of 'pragmatic enrichment' which contribute to the recovery of the proposition that is taken to have been directly communicated by the speaker ('what is said' in the terms of Recanati (2004) , 'explicature' in RT terms). Consider two examples of what can be described as relevance-based, local pragmatic enrichment of truth-conditional content (both taken from Simons (forthcoming)):
4.
A: What's making all that noise in the attic?
B: Either there's a nest up there or some squirrels have moved in.
[ 'nest' understood to mean occupied (by birds) nest ]
5.
A: I'll see you next month at the conference in Boston. These are cases of the enrichment of embedded content, which contributes to the proposition expressed (the disjunction in (4) and the conditional in (5)), so they cannot be Gricean implicatures, properly speaking. Simons' primary goal is to show that these can be accounted for by Gricean rational reconstructions of a pretty standard sort, a matter of global reasoning involving the Cooperative Principle and the maxim of Relation. Without going into the details, the reasoning turns on recognising an apparent failure of relevance of the whole complex utterance and locating that failure in a subclause, e.g. in (4), the first disjunct 'there's a nest up there' isn't a fully relevant answer to the question about the source of noise (it is not nests that emit noise but certain occupants of them).
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On the face of it, these look very much like cases of pragmatic inferences making a contribution to content, to the public meaning, which on L&S's account should be tracked on the conversational record. This richer content often influences the linguistic acts of subsequent speakers (e.g. 'That doesn't sound like birds to me' uttered by A in the case of (4), or 'Yes, thanks, but I won't be able to help with the driving as I've lost my license' in the case of (5)), which is one of the key roles envisaged for the conversational record by Lewis (1979 (2004)) would allow that grasping the proposition the speaker is expressing (not merely implicating) here requires the derivation of further content which is a matter of pragmatics rather than of linguistic convention. In (6a), the picture may be a portrait of Mary, it may have been painted by her, just bought by her, her favourite one, the one she pointed at earlier on, the one that haunts her dreams, and so on; in (6b), there must be some more or less specific activity or event his readiness for which the addressee is being asked about (but there are no semantic constraints at all on what that event/activity may be).
What the two have in common is the fact that no speaker ever intends to communicate just the invariant meaning that the linguistic forms alone provide. If asked 'Mary's picture in what sense?' or 'ready for what?', it would be absurd for the speaker to respond 'I just mean Mary's picture in some/any sense or other' or 'I just mean: are you ready punkt'. In both cases, the relevant occasion-specific unit of content has to be pragmatically inferred. In (6c), the point is essentially the same but runs a little differently as, arguably, the two compound nominals 'headache pills' and 'fertility pills' are sufficiently conventionalised that a pragmatic inference is not now required. However, the conventionalised relation between 'pills' and the nominal modifier is the opposite in the two cases (to reduce, to increase, respectively) and the more general point about noun-noun compounds is the absence of any constraint on the relation that might hold between them. Consider, for instance, the various nominal relations understood for 'sweet shop', 'honey bee', 'mouse mat', 'doormat', 'pontoon bridge', 'birth mark', 'boot camp', and so on and on. Furthermore, it is not difficult to come up with scenarios in which the relation between the head noun and modifying noun is other than the one that has become established (e.g. pills that induce headaches (perhaps for some experimental purpose) and pills that inhibit fertility). This is all a matter of an initial pragmatic inference made in response to a specific contextual goal or concern, with subsequent conventionalisation of the relation inferred. In the absence of a particular context, all we can say about the meaning of the hypothetical nominal compound 'whiskers fork' is that it refers to a kind of fork (the syntax gives us that), which is in some relation to whiskers (it could be made of them, look like them, be used to do something to them, or whatever other possibilities the world allows).
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To conclude this section: L&S have a task on their hands to explain away a range of determinate components of communicated meaning which are significant contributions to the inquiry under discussion and should therefore be entered on the public conversational record, but which are provided by pragmatic inference rather than by linguistic conventions.
Polysemy and pragmatics
A case that L&S consider in some detail concerns what is traditionally known as an 'indirect speech act' (Searle 1975 them to get what we want, issues that arise from imposing on others, expectations of politeness, etc., and, specifically here, the standard social roles and behaviour of customers and waiters in restaurants. Given this sort of general knowledge, we can see clearly the inferential connection between the literal sentence meanings in (8) and the speech act of placing an order/request, a connection which is missing in the case of the utterances in (9). According to L&S, 'Conventionality and calculability must be incompatible. …
Conventions require alternatives, but the existence of alternatives means it would be rational that the conventional case didn't hold, and so, you can't calculate anything from it.' (p. 104).
Certainly if a component of utterance meaning cannot be calculated, then it must be conventional -this was Grice's point, I think, in using the calculability requirement as a necessary condition on conversational implicatures and thereby distinguishing them from conventional implicatures. However, if some element of meaning is calculable (can be calculated), it may be derived either pragmatically or via a convention, where the convention is one that has a pragmatic (i.e. calculated) origin.
As I understand it, Lewis allows for various ways in which an instance of new meaning coordination can be achieved (and can, therefore, provide the basis/precedent on which a convention may ultimately become established). As L&S say, 'For Lewis, conventions are established gradually. At first, coordination succeeds through other mechanisms, like salience, good luck, or partial or tentative precedents ' (p.: 252) . It is a mystery to me why they do not acknowledge here the role of a pragmatic inferential mechanism in achieving an initial coordination. Setting aside 'good luck', which doesn't seem nouns. These are just two of the many kinds of innovative uses of language which our pragmatic capacities make possible. 
Conceptions of linguistic knowledge
My main aim in this commentary has been, if not to refute, to raise strong doubt about L&S's claim that the shared content of utterances is entirely a matter of linguistic and discourse conventions, and the only role played by pragmatics is disambiguation. I've argued that pragmatics can and often does play a content-contributing role in our meaning-making. It can provide audiences with occasion-specific content that is not a matter of linguistic convention, as in the ad hoc quantity implicature cases and the relevance-based enrichments of truthconditional content. It is also one of the primary means by which an initial meaning coordination is achieved when a new linguistic expression or new sense of an existing form is produced, making for a precedent, which, through repeated use, may result in a new meaning convention.
To conclude, I want to touch briefly on a different matter, one that is highly relevant to the appropriate positioning of L&S's stance within the scientific study of human language.
There is a massive and striking disparity between the way L&S conceive of linguistic knowledge and grammar, and the way these are conceived of by linguists working in the generative grammar tradition (e.g. Chomsky 2000). The operative notion for these linguists is 'I-language', a component of the human mind whose workings are largely inaccessible to consciousness and whose mature state is underpinned by an innately-given species-specific 'language faculty', such that the acquired elements of the system are essentially just a set of constrained parameter-fixing options. As L&S themselves note: 'Linguists' understanding of the language faculty fits poorly with the assumption that linguistic meaning is conventional in 
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